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Abstract: The methodology of Structural Balance Budget proposed by the IMF 
and OECD is applied to Brazil from 1997 to 2013 with the objective to identify the 
behavior of fiscal policy. This methodology, according to the international literature, 
is an very important instrument, once it takes into account the effect of the business 
cycle on public finances. The results showed that fiscal policy, as a countercyclical 
instrument, began to be used from 2004 or 2005, depending on the methodology. In 
the period in which the country suffered the greatest consequences of the subprime 
crisis, fiscal policy proved to be a very well used tool to mitigate the effects of the 
crisis. One reason for the improvement of the use of fiscal policy, at this period, was 
the decrease in the stock of public debt, provided by primary surpluses occurred in 
previous years. This results are in line with those found by public finances resear-
chers. Thus, the pre-crisis fiscal situation has become an important element in the 
performance of countercyclical fiscal policies. Furthermore, both methodologies 
did not show large differences among themselves.
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Introduction
Theories of fiscal and monetary policies were developed to consider several 
aspects of microeconomics and macroeconomics, such as business cycle, em-
ployment, taxes, interest rates etc. One of the most important is the influence 
of the cycles to better understand the results of these policies. In the case of the 
Fiscal Balance this influence is direct, affecting both revenues and expenses. 
In this process a fiscal policy can both be pro as countercyclical, generating 
significant impacts on various economic agents.
Some authors, such as Budnevich (2002) and Auerbach (2005), suggest 
that in the economic cycle, fiscal policy is a very important tool, especially 
in recession periods. At this, the stabilizer function can be expansionary to 
mitigate the recessionary cycle. The opposite is also true, so that when the 
cycle is at the stage of prosperity, the fiscal policy should be used sparingly, 
since excessive government spending could cause the economy to grow above 
the considered normal. Thus, the government can simply reduce it’s spending 
or else raise taxes so that the disposable income of the private sector decre-
ases. When there are large fluctuations of the fiscal policy it is natural to see 
imbalances in the economy, either in prices, production activity, the labor 
market or foreign accounts.
Thus, the reasons for having such a persistent inflationary process, as in 
Brazil between the 1970s and 1980s, may be linked, at least in part, to the 
high public deficit. On the other hand, in the first years of the Real Plan, the 
Government reformulated the state, where one of the goals was the improve-
ment of public accounts, tax control and construction of basis to price stability. 
It is noteworthy that this period included a fiscal effort by federal, state and 
municipalities, and also there was an addendum to extraordinary revenues 
from privatizations and concessions in several areas such as financial services, 
roads and electric sector.
Discretionary fiscal policy has an important role in controlling the variability 
of the business cycle, that is, without the use of this tool the business cycle 
becomes more volatile, especially in countries like Brazil, where there are 
additional complicating factors such as big budget rigidities where only 11% 
of the recipes are free, Maciel (2005). In this sense, the fiscal rule1 becomes a 
key element, since it may become a barrier to ease the business cycle.
However, there is a dichotomy between the use of the fiscal policy which the 
main objective is to decrease the deficit bias from that used to reduce its pro 
cyclicality, according to Perry (2002). If the goal is just to improve public ac-
counts the result can be a greater distance from the stage when the economy 
1 Fiscal rule is a term used to define the legal restrictions that impose limits on indicators used in the 
assessment of tax administration.
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is in the economic cycle of its long-term level, since it ignores the effects of 
transitory shocks. On the other hand, if the goal is to create a strictly coun-
tercyclical fiscal tool, it can become unsustainable and unreliable, since there 
is the possibility that the balance of long-term debt will not be obtained. This 
is where comes the idea of automatic fiscal stabilizers, preventing the deficit 
bias of accounts and also great movement in public spending.
Another problem encountered in too rigid regimes are the changes in tax 
procedures, in what is called creative accounting2 as pointed out by Milesi-
-Ferretti (2000). In this sense, the Structural Balance Budget (SBB) becomes 
an interesting option in a target regime, since there is more flexible fiscal rule, 
because there is the possibility of using fiscal policy to alleviate the cycle in 
addition to considering the effect of the cycle on public accounts. Considering 
the importance of fiscal policy in the macroeconomic equilibrium process, the 
purpose of this study is to identify whether it is possible to say that Brazil had 
in fact, during the Real Plan, a tax adjustment, and investigate whether fiscal 
policy was countercyclical in the period 1997-2013, using as a backdrop the 
methodology of SBB. The application of this model become more relevant 
after the global financial crisis, which demanded greater attention to the 
fiscal side of various countries and put into perspective the social problems, 
price stability and debt.
The application of SBB has three important aspects in the analysis of fiscal 
policy, as seen in Dobrescu et al. (2011). The first is to measure discretionary 
changes in fiscal policy. The second is to measure fiscal sustainability. And 
finally, there is the possibility of obtaining the stance of fiscal policy, ie, whe-
ther is expansionary or contractionary. Our findings indicate, first, that, by 
applying the SBB for the Brazilian economy from 2007 to 2010, a period of 
economic turmoil due to the subprime crisis, for example, fiscal policy was 
countercyclical. On the other hand, most likely due to the bias of the public 
deficit reduction, in the years 1998 to 2003 fiscal policy was pro-cyclical.
Besides this introduction, this paper has four sections. The first shortly explain 
business cycle, fiscal policy and structural budget balance through a concep-
tual and theoretical review. In the second section the methodology of the SBB 
from IMF and OECD is presented. Third section analyse Brazilian economy 
in the period between 1997 and 2013, and in the fourth one we comment the 
Brazilian SBB and principal results. Finally, the last section concludes.
1. Cycle, Fiscal policy and sbb
The theories of business cycles began to be developed from the nineteenth 
century and were common to relate the economic cycle with weather events, 
2 Creative accounting is a process where the reality of the accounting of a particular entity is disguised. For 
this, the data are manipulated in order to display the desired image, Kraemer (2008).
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the production of grains and their prices, according to Pustil’nik (2004). 
Already at that time, the visions about the causes and behavior of economic 
cycles were not unified, that is, there was disagreement between the studies. 
This was related to reasons why cycles behaved as wave movements, even 
among authors who shared the same basic view of how the economy worked.
As the theory incorporated cycle measurement techniques it was created a 
better understand of economic movements and use this in other areas. Curren-
tly, the wave behavior, cycle phases and their characteristics can be evaluated 
from parametric and non-parametric techniques, like Bry and Boschan (1971) 
and Hamilton (1989). In this case, the relationship between the theory of 
business cycles and fiscal policy is direct, and may be pro or countercyclical 
depending on how behaves the Government Budget Balance.
It is common to observe in the literature that fiscal policy is procyclical in 
developing economies, see Alesina et al. (2008), Mendoza and Oviedo (2006), 
Talvi and Végh (2005) and Ilzetski and Végh (2008). This is not only due to 
imperfections in the international market, but also due to political pressures. 
One of the reasons of procyclicality is that government revenues, indepen-
dently if they come from taxes or royalties, rise in periods of boom. However, 
the government can not resist the seduction or political pressure to increase 
their spending at the same rate or greater magnitude. Thus, the increase of 
theses spends generally focuses on two areas of Government. The first is the 
public investment expenditure, while the second is the public employment.
Subprime crisis created a challenge scenario to Governments and has grown 
the interest in verify the relevance of fiscal policy in the economic recovery 
in the light of the various stimulus packages that have been implemented in 
developed economies. As pointed out by Dolls et al (2012) fiscal policy was 
a central tool in combating economic stagnation in Europe and USA. And in 
countries where automatic fiscal stabilizers are larger, there is a tendency for 
smaller fiscal stimulus packages, besides the fact that the size of this stimulus 
is related to the tax status of each country in the pre-crisis period. Studies on 
automatic fiscal stabilizers and their relationship to the cycle in Brazil indicate 
a small role, interfering little fluctuations in the product Rocha (2009), but 
that fiscal policy has a direct relationship with the political cycle, as shown in 
Neto et al. (2013) for data from the State of Minas Gerais in Brazil.
Confronted with evidence of a relationship between the economic cycle and 
fiscal policy is natural to imagine that the structural budget balance is presen-
ted as an alternative to the usual Budget Balance. Thus, the observed changes 
in this are not necessarily associated with changes in fiscal policy, since a 
worsening or improvement of the fiscal balance may simply be associated 
with the phase in the economic cycle. Thus, the SBB has greater scale when 
it comes to observing the direction of fiscal policy and the improvements or 
deteriorations observed in the public accounts.
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In periods where the economy grows above its natural long-term trend we 
look for an increase in revenues simultaneously with a reduction in spending. 
Thus, this interpretation of Budget Balance without cyclicality adjustment 
could lead to misinterpretation, so that this “bonus” observed in the primary 
surplus can be understood as perpetual. Conversely, when the economy is 
below its long term trend, there will be a decline in revenues along with incre-
ased spending, which will lead to a lower primary surplus economy than if it 
were on its trend. Thus, Budget Balance without adjustment can’t distinguish 
between what is cyclic and what is structural component.
It is in this sense that the methodology of the structural budget balance is 
presented as an interesting alternative, as in this case there will be discrimi-
nation between the structural component and the temporary. Thus, one can 
more easily use fiscal policy to bring the economy to its trend and organize 
more efficiently the expenses, especially those related to investments.
The structural budget outcome has two conventional methodologies and 
widely used in the international literature, the OECD, presented by Giorno 
et al. (1995), and the IMF, presented in Hagemann (1999). Both have been 
implemented in several countries, mainly from the 2000s. Worth noting that 
in some regions, such as Latin America, for example, the authors apply this 
methodology to look for what alternative was used with some innovations, 
such as commodity prices that have a significant impact on government re-
venues. Such measures are adopted in order to make better estimates, like 
Klemm(2014) that find evidence of procyclical fiscal policy on average of 
Latin America countries despite some differences. Examples of work with 
such modifications are Rincón et al, (2004) for Colombia and Gouvea et al 
(2011) for Brazil. In both the price of oil were used as element in the fiscal 
budget, Marcel and Tokman (2002) use copper price to estimate the struc-
tural balance in Chile, Frankel (2011) suggests that countries that have pro-
-cyclical fiscal policy use the tax rules to control cycles, especially if they are 
commodity exporters. Some examples at region of successful countercyclical 
fiscal policy are Chile, Mexico and Colombia. Chile determined the income 
tax according to the estimates of the structural balance, see Frankel (2011) 
and Schmidt-Hebbel(2012), obtaining satisfactory results in the stabilization 
of the economic cycle. Others results are Rodriguez et al (2007) and Larrain 
and Parro (2006) which allowed even to overcome the economic difficulties 
of the period of crisis during 2008-2009 and Céspedes and Velasco(2013) 
that showed different performance in fiscal policy between countries after 
international crisis.
The purpose of this work is to use the aggregate IMF methodology exposed 
by Dobrescu et al, (2011), and applied by Maciel (2005) for Brazil and the 
OECD methodology, which uses the method of disaggregated elasticities in 
groups, to measure the structural balance of Brazil, and is presented in Mello 
and Moccero (2006). Despite the some advantages of OECD methodology 
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compared with the IMF, such as it is possible to observe the impact of the 
business cycle in diffent groups of revenues, there are greater chances of er-
rors in the data adjustment process from the disaggregated elasticities, see 
Gouvea et al (2011). Therefore, in order to avoid such errors in the application 
of SBB we use OECD methodology proposed by Mello and Moccero (2006).
In any of the methods proposed to obtain the structural budget balance we 
follow three steps. In the first we estimate the potential GDP and the ou-
tput gap. The second involves the quantification of the cyclical component 
of expenditure and government revenue. In this part we use the estimated 
income-elasticity product. And finally, in the third one, subtract this cyclical 
component of revenue and expenditure levels observed, calculating the SBB. 
Although split into only three steps, it is noteworthy that there are several 
techniques that can be used in step one to calculate potential GDP, as well as 
the estimated income-elasticity of the product, see Maciel (2005).
The estimation of the potential output, for example, can be obtained through 
a function of production3 or the use of statistical filters. The first case usually 
adopts a Cobb-Douglas specification with factors capital and labor, and also 
may be used more generally specified as the function with constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES). Alternatively, the most commonly used filters for the 
estimation of potential GDP are the Hodrick-Prescott (HP), see Hodrick 
and Prescott (1997) and Ravn and Uhlig (2002), and the Kalman filter, see 
Harvey (1990) and Houtekamer (1998). Subtracting the cyclical part of the 
balance observed is done via elasticities of revenues and expenditures of the 
government. As stated earlier, the most widespread methods for obtaining 
these elasticities are the IMF and OECD proposals by Hagemann (1999) and 
Giorno et al. (1995), respectively. The main difference in the calculation of 
the SBB between these occurs exactly in the estimation of such elasticities.
It is noteworthy that, on the expenditure side, only the unemployment account 
are adjusted, both in OECD methodology as the IMF. In this sense, the OECD 
uses as a reference the level of structural unemployment, while the IMF use 
the unemployment rate that doesn’t accelerate inflation, the NAIRU. Howe-
ver, as done in Marcel and Tokman (2002), Rincón et al. (2004) and Maciel 
(2005), this work doesn’t use expenditure adjustment via IMF methodology, 
since spending on unemployment insurance are not representative of the total 
expenditures of the Federal Government4 in Brazil.
Already at the revenue side, according to Gouveia et al (2011), the process 
is slightly more complex when comparing the two methods. The OECD de-
compose the elasticities of revenues into two components, where the first one 
are the elasticities of revenue with respect to their respective bases to and the 
3 For a greater understanding of the estimation of potential GDP via the production function see Giorno et 
al. (1995).
4 In 2013, for example, the amount spent on unemployment insurance was 4.94% to the total expenditure of 
the Central Government. Thus, the amount spent on unemployment insurance does not quite represent 1% 
of GDP.
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second is a coefficient that represents the elasticity of the tax base due to the 
economic cycle. Moreover, the IMF methodology proposes simply to estimate 
parameters of elasticity for each category of tax collection, see Oreng (2012).
Alternatively to the classical methodology of the IMF, also can get the elasticity 
revenue-product aggregate, as shown in Dobrescu et al, (2011), which is fully 
compatible with the work done by Hagemann (1999). The authors 
emphasize that the aggregate method, in terms of results, is very similar to 
the model in which revenues are disaggregated. The advantage of disaggre-
gated view is the possibility of the existence of large differences in sensitivity 
between groups of expenses and income with the cycle. However, because 
there is much information, at this point is more difficulty and there is great 
possibility of larger errors. 
2. Structural Budget Balance (Sbb)
This section is intended to show the structural budget balance. For this, we 
present the aggregate IMF and the disaggregated OECD methodology. As 
previously mentioned, the big difference between the two methodologies is in 
the elasticities, so that the IMF this is obtained by the total revenue. Already 
from the perspective of OECD revenue is broken down into groups, so it is 
estimated elasticities for each income group in relation to its incidence base 
and then of its incidence base in relation to the output gap. Already on the 
expenditure side the only expense that has cyclical behavior are those related 
to unemployment.
2.1 IMF Methodology
The SBB, according to Dobrescu et al, (2011), can be written as in equation 3.1, 
where B, R and E are, respectively, the budget balance, revenues and expenses 
and the subscript c refers to the cyclical and s is the structural component. 
Thus, the sum of the cyclical components , )c t (B  and structural ,( )s tB  one results 
in the budget balance observed in period t t B ,
                                               
, ,+t c t s tB  B  = B
   
                                                                                                                                           (3.1)
or:
                                                                                             
                                              ( ) ( ), , , ,= − + −t c t  c t s t s tB  R  E  R  E                         (3.2)
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where, 
                                    , ,
= +s t t c t  R  R  R                           (3.3)
Note that, as argued, the result to the cyclic recipe is not available. This can 
be achieved through an adjustment on the observed revenue using an elasti-
city of revenue-product. After this we do the adjustment of expenditure via 
spending on unemployment insurance that diverge from the current level of 
unemployment and the NAIRU5. Thus, structural revenue is calculated in year 
t, given the elasticity-revenue product6 ( )γ , adjusting the observed revenue 
and the value that reflects the gap in potential output *ty  with the observed 
product ( )tY , called t( )C , Like this:
                                                     ,
.( )γ=s t t tR  R   C                                         (3.4)
Where the output gap is given by:
      
                                              =
*
t
t
t
YC
Y                                        (3.5)
      
Thus, the SBB can be described as follows:
 
                                                    , ,= −t s t s tSBB R  E                               (3.6)
2.2 OECD Methodology
In this proposal the elasticities are calculated on a disaggregated basis with 
the possibility to see the different cycles in each group of revenues. Therefore, 
the equation to find the SBB, as shown in Dobrescu et al (2011), is given by:
5 Authors such as Marcel and Tokman (2002), Rincón et al. (2003), Maciel (2005) and Oreng (2012), applying 
the structural balance for Latin American economies also do not perform adjustments on the expenditure 
side. For a deeper about why not make the adjustment see Gobetti et al. (2010).
6 This shows how much revenue will vary in percentage terms if the product range by 1%.
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1=
  
= − + −  
  
∑
N
CA CA NCA NCA
i cur
i
CAB  R G  R  G
                   (3.7)
Where CAiR  represents the cyclical component of adjusted revenue category 
i, CAcurG  represents the current primary spending adjusted by the cycle, and 
NCAR  and NCAG  are the revenues and expenditures that do not require cyclical 
adjustments.
On the revenue side, each category can be decomposed into two factors. Thus, 
the total elasticity Ri,y )γ(  is the elasticity of revenue ( )iR  in relation to its base 
)i(B , γ i iR B , with the elasticity of the base relative to the output gap, ,γ Bi  Y ,
                                         , ,
,γγ γ=Ri  Y RiBi Bi Y                                           (3,8)
Applying 3.8 to find the adjusted revenue for the cyclic component of cate-
gory i:
          ( )( ), γγ= RiBiBi YCAi i tR R  C                                    (3.9)
Note that the difference between equation 3.9, OECD proposal, and 3.4, IMF 
proposal, it is precisely the existence of an income elasticity of decomposed 
into elements i, relative to its base. The practical implication of this change 
is that we may have different responses of the collection in relation to the 
business cycle, for example, income tax, tax on production or consumption. 
Also decompose the elasticity of current expenditure into two factors, where 
the elasticity of expenditure 
,
( )γ
cur  YG  is the product of the elasticity of current 
spending ( )curG  with respect to their base, in this case unemployment, with 
respect to the output gap, as shown in 3.10:
               
                                            , ,
,,γ γγ =cur  Y cur  UG G U Y                                         (3.10)
The decomposition can be adjusted to find the cyclic component for expen-
diture in category i:
                                  
( )( ) ,,γ γ= cur UU Y GCAcur cur tG G  C
                         (3.11)
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It is noteworthy that only costs related to unemployment insurance have been 
cyclical, thus other expenditure do not require adjustments. Another impor-
tant difference between the methodology of the IMF and the OECD is that this 
applies cyclically adjusted spending from 3.11, while in the IMF proposal this 
is not done. Depending on this elasticity and the share of spending related 
to unemployment in total spending, this setting can produce very different 
results between the two methodologies. Notably, in a period of elevated nega-
tive shock to the economy which results in increased expenditure, especially 
with unemployment insurance, it is natural to imagine that the result pointed 
out by the OECD methodology differs from that proposed by the IMF. On 
the revenue side, literature usually separate the revenues into four groups: i) 
Personal income tax (PIT); ii) social contribution (SS); iii) corporate profits 
(CIT) and iv) Indirect Tax (IT),
3. Structural Budget Results
This section is divided in five parts. In the first one, it is estimate the GDP 
gap, where three different methods will be applied, as well as the trend GDP. 
It is noteworthy that the results obtained in this first section will be used for 
budget outcome through the methodology of the IMF and the OECD. In the 
second part, we estimate the elasticity of revenue-aggregated product from 
the perspective of the IMF, while the third shows the same under the OECD 
methodology. In the fourth section we estimate the structural budget balance 
for Brazil, besides a comparison of the two methodologies. Finally, the fifth 
section analysis the fiscal policy through the results from the structural budget 
balance in both methodologies.
3.1 Potential Output
To compare the result with the observed and structural it is essential to 
perform the estimation of potential output. The original series is quarterly 
GDP IBGE’s index number. By comparing three different methods, HP, 
Christiano-Fitzgerald and the trend of GDP by the X-12 Arima7 is possible to 
note similarities in the results for the cyclical factor. Therefore, it is chosen 
to use the HP filter, so this is also the most used in the literature.
7 We call this method of TC.
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3.2 Elasticity Revenue Product-Imf
The revenue data are from the Treasury Department, discounted transfers to 
states and municipalities. Then these values  are deflated by the IPCA price 
to 2013 at quarterly basis and with seasonal adjustment by X-12. The regres-
sions follows the proposed by Maciel (2005) that uses log for the elasticities. 
Various estimations were made with the exogenous variable log (GDP) lagged 
by one to two quarters, using dummy variables to control possible outliers or 
structural breaks and also a trend. The final equation was regressed with 68 
observations and the software used was the Eviews 7.1. The main equations 
permormed, along with their coefficients and the main tests, can be found in 
the table A.1 in the Annex.
The dummies 1, 3 and 4, as seen in equation 5.1, were used to correct a pro-
blem of outlier, ie a point outside the curve that appeared in 4Q08, 3Q10 and 
4Q13, respectively8.  Thus, we used values  of 0 for all quarters except precisely 
that quarter in outlier, which received the value of 1. Already dummy 2 was 
used in order to monitor the change in the exchange rate regime in the year 
1999, fiscal rules and the adoption of the inflation targeting regime. Thus, 
this dummy was not treated as a transitory shock and received value 0 until 
the last quarter of 1998 and 1 from the first quarter of 1999 until the end of 
the period of the series.
Thus, among the estimated equations, which presents the best comparison 
criteria (Akaike and Schwarz), smaller statistical error of prediction (MAE, 
RMSE and MAPE) and significant coefficients9, was:
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0.89 0.006 0.31 1 0.08 2 0.09 3 0.03 41.084log
0.93 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.010.22
−
= + + + + + −
t D D D Dgdp
Log r  (5.1)
Where ( )r  is the revenue, ( )gdp  is GDP, t  is trend and D1, D2, D3 and D4 
are dummies, The LM test10 signals for the nonexistence of autocorrelation, 
( ) [ ]1 0.16 0.68=LM  and ( ) [ ]2 0.33 0.84=LM , In addition, the test ( ) [ ]1 0.42 0.51=ARCH  
and  can not reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. As can be seen, the 
value found for the income-elasticity product is Ɣ=1.084, between 0.62 and 
1.54 at 95% significance. This value is close to that found by Maciel (2005) for 
Brazil, Ɣ=1.025 for the period 1999-2005, Additionally, Marcel and Tokman 
(2002) study for Chile Ɣ=1.05, also being within the range of [0.95 1.25] found 
by Hagemann (1999) for OECD countries. 
Thus, this elasticity shows that for every 1% change in GDP has been a change 
8 The tax evolution observed in this period is due to overheating of the Brazilian economy in the first half 
of 2010, with growth of 9.2% in the first quarter and 9.3% in the second, compared with the same period in 
2009. Remember that there is a lag between actual tax payment and the triggering event.
9 Number in parentheses below each variable represents the standard deviation.
10 Numbers in brackets in this section represent the p-value.
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of 1,08% in revenues, maintaining all other variables constant. It is in this 
sense that Maciel (2005) points out that the value of the elasticity should be 
close to one, since, if the government were to raise taxes in an extreme form, 
the amount of revenue could exceed GDP in the long run. The dummy 2 sho-
ws a change in tax revenue from the first quarter of 1999 resulted not only 
in a change of the exchange rate regime, but also major changes in tax rules.
3.3 Elasticity Revenue Product-Oecd
It is noteworthy that this section, unlike section applied to the IMF, the 
elasticities are not estimated, but assumed. This happens due to the greater 
difficulty of estimation of these compared to the previous method. Thus, we 
use elasticities estimated by Mello and Moccero (2006) and presented in 
the table 5.1. It is noticed that the elasticity of the first group of revenue, ie 
the group regarding the personal income tax (PIT), is well above the OECD 
average. This indicates, according to Mello and Moccero (2006), that the 
personal income tax in Brazil is more progressive than in OECD countries.
Already elasticity in relation to contributions to social security (SS) is very 
close to the average of OECD countries. If the side of the personal income tax 
elasticity was well above average, when analyzing corporate income tax (CIT) 
is perceived that they are below the OECD average. And the last group with 
respect to revenue, the indirect taxes (IT), it is assumed that the elasticity 
refers to the group is unitary. Already in the elasticity of expenditure, it is 
considered just transfers related to unemployment sensitive to the cycle. Thus, 
Mello and Moccero (2006) found an elasticity of -0.06, indicating that the 
sensitivity of the expenditure in relation to the cycle in Brazil is low compared 
with OECD countries. The authors claim that this low sensitivity to the cycle 
occurs at least in part, due to a substantial informal sector.
TABLE 5.1 - ELASTICITy OF BRAzIL AND OECD AVERAGE
Revenue Expenditure Total¹
PIT SS CIT Indirect Taxes
Brazil 2.70 0.67 1.17 1.00 -0.06 0.32
OCDE 
average
1.26 0.71 1.50 1.00 -0.10 0.44
Source: Mello and Moccero (2006) for Brazil, and Girouard and Andre (2006) for the OECD average.
1. Refers to the elasticity of the structural balance to changes in the economic cycle, It is calculated as 
the difference between the sensitivity of the four items of income and expenditure, weighted by their 
respective shares of GDP in 2003.
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3.4 Structural Fiscal Balance in Brazil
After the estimation of elasticity-revenue product we can use this in the rule 
appointed at section 3 for the Brazilian economy. The sample period comprises 
five presidential cycles. Graph 5.1 shows the evolution of observed revenue 
and structural revenues, the latter obtained by the method of the IMF and 
the OECD, using equation 3.4 and 3.9, respectively. The difference between 
them is due to removal of the cyclic factor of the revenue and the difference 
between the elasticities. Indeed, when the product grows above its trend, 
there is a portion of the revenue that comes precisely from the higher level of 
activity. The reverse is also true, so that when grow below trend the income 
level is below too. This is considered normal.
GRAPH 5. 1- OBSERVED AND STRUCTURAL REVENUE- NO. INDEX
Source: Authors elaboration
Graph 5.2 shows the evolution of observed expenditure and structural, the 
latter referring to the OECD method, since the side of the IMF was not treated 
for this. The two are very similar and this occurs due to expenditure related to 
unemployment being very low in the composition of total expenditure11. Thus, 
as can be seen, for Brazil, the differences in results for the structural budget 
balance between the two methodologies are, in general, at the revenue side.
11 On 2013, the expenses with unemployment represented less than 5% of total federal expenses.
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GRAPH 5. 2 - EXPENDITURE TRENDS OBSERVED AND STRUCTURAL
Source: Authors elaboration
With these results, is possible to estimate the structural budget balance 
method with the IMF using equation 3.6, since the treatment on the expen-
diture side is not necessary. The structural budget balance, obtained by both 
methods, and observed for the Brazilian economy is presented in graph 5.3. 
It is noticed that the structural budget balance obtained by IMF methodology 
is less volatile12 than the observed and this, in turn, lower than the OECD 
structural balance.
12 The standard deviation confirms that volatility of the IMF model is less volatile, while the OECD is more 
volatile than the balance observed. Thus, σ = 3.58 for the balance without cyclical adjustment, σ = 3.29 for 
the model of the IMF and σ = 4.02 for the OECD Model.
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GRAPH 5. 3 - OBSERVED AND STRUCTURAL BALANCE BUDGET -% OF GDP
Source: Authors elaboration
Although useful for the analysis of fiscal policy, the estimated structural ba-
lance quarterly shows very little volatile and represent very little on reality, 
once the conduct of fiscal policy and the cyclical behavior of the economy 
occur over longer periods. Thus, besides the quarterly structural balance, 
we get the same results in annual periodicity, using both the OECD and IMF 
methodology, in order to compare this with the primary surplus in Federal 
Government. It is noteworthy that in this part we used the same elasticities 
presented13 above, that is, Ɛ = 1.084 for the IMF and submitted by Mello and 
Moccero (2006) for the OECD.
Graph 5.4 shows the ratio between potential and actual GDP and contributes 
to understanding structural balance. Whenever this value is less than one, 
this means that the country has grown above trend, that is, the potential 
output will be lower than the actual GDP, resulting in an additional amount 
of revenue, precisely because of the elasticity being greater than unity, and 
that will be corrected in the structural balance, which withdraws the cyclical 
part of the revenue. But when the opposite occurs, ie, potential GDP is grea-
ter than real GDP, and this value is greater than one, this will lead to a lower 
than considered normal, if there were no output gap. Thus, the points below 
the red line are those where there were gains arising inflow of the economic 
cycle, since the points above this line are the periods in which the revenue 
was lower due to the cycle.
Following the methodology, the years in which growth was below trend, 
showed lower revenues than normal periods. Thus, the structural balance is 
greater than that observed since the recipes do not change. And the opposite is 
13 We opted to use the same elasticity since the annual period because of lack of data.
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also true, ie, in years where growth was higher than the trend we get revenues 
bonus resulting from this increased growth. This will cause structural balance 
difference that is lower than the observed primary surplus.  
GRAPH 5. 4 - POTENTIAL AND EFFECTIVE GDP RATIO
Source: Authors elaboration
Graph 5.5 shows the difference between the observed balance from the 
structural, ie the observed subtracted the structural, for both IMF and OECD 
methodology. This difference shows the amount, as a percentage of GDP, 
which has been added or removed from revenue. Positive values  mean how 
the primary surplus occurred at above trend growth, not coming from the 
fiscal effort. Negative values  represent the amount of income that was not 
collected because real GDP was lower than trend GDP. In this case, before the 
occurrence of such event the fiscal policy need toward tax effort to bring the 
deficit to near unity. It is noticed that this difference is, in general, between 
-0.50% and 0.50% of GDP. The year 1997 was a turbulent year and can be con-
sidered, therefore, an exception. Thus, the structural budget balances shows 
up, and very importantly, a tool that would not generate large distortions in 
the results obtained, as the mean difference, ie  was 0% and 0.12% GDP for 
the model of the IMF and the OECD, respectively. 
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GRAPH 5. 5 - DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBSERVED AND STRUCTURAL RESULTS 
(OBS-EST) % OF GDP
Source: Authors elaboration
4. Fiscal Expansion or Contraction?
With the SBB estimated we can get precision about fiscal policy direction with 
greater reliability than that obtained through the primary surplus, since, at 
first, the effects of the economic cycle were removed. For this, to distinguish 
whether fiscal policy was expansionary or contractionary, you must subtract 
the value of the structural budget balance of the year under the previous year. 
Whenever this amount is positive, fiscal policy is contractionary. Conversely, 
when this amount is negative, fiscal policy was expansionary. Still, one might 
wonder how contractionary or expansionary fiscal policy was in any year from 
the magnitude of this difference.
The years in which there is the greatest disparity observed between the primary 
surplus and the structural budget balance, both as a proportion of GDP, are 
those where greater distances between trend GDP and observed GDP were 
seen. Thus, on one hand, the year 1997 showed the largest tax receipt provided 
by the business cycle. On the other hand, in 2003, the opposite happened, 
where it failed to raise the largest amount depending on the economic cycle. 
This is true both for model results via IMF or OECD methodology. However, 
it is worth noting the magnitude of the difference between the two methodolo-
gies applied to observed outcome and structural analyzes in 1997. At this year 
the difference was much greater in the OECD model, compared to the IMF.
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From 1999 to 2006, except for 2000 where the economic cycle had little impact 
on revenues, every year had a GDP growth below the trend line, which caused 
the observed primary surplus smaller than the structural, since revenues were 
adversely affected by phase of the cycle of the economy. However, when we 
look from 2007 to 2011, except for 2009, where it had the greatest impact of 
the subprime crisis, it is noticed that the opposite occurs, and the economy 
grew above trend, and that observed surplus was higher than the structural, 
due to additional revenues from higher growth. This is true for both models, 
indicating no major differences in results. 
The above trend in times of crisis, indicate that fiscal policy was used in a 
discretionary manner, contrary to cycle. Already in the last two years, 2012 
and 2013, it was observed a period again where it grew less than the trend and 
the structural budget balance was greater than the primary surplus, signaling 
fiscal difficulties. It is worth noting that the cyclical effect on results in OECD 
model was lower than the IMF. Table 5.2 shows the average primary surplus 
and the structural budget balance in presidential cycles. It is noticed that the 
first and the last two presidential cycles had an observed primary surplus gre-
ater than the structural budget balance, since, on average, these presidential 
cycles had actual GDP greater than potential GDP, for both methodologies.
In the second and third presidential cycle the average primary surplus is 
smaller than the structural budget balance, indicating that this period the 
Government experienced lower tax collection where actual GDP is less than 
potential GDP, both for the model of the IMF and OECD. The largest observed 
difference occurs in the first presidential cycle, being well above the OECD 
model. This is due mainly to the difference observed in 1997. Accordingly, the 
average of five presidential cycles for the primary surplus was 1.87%, while 
for the structural budget balance was 1.82% and 1.64% to the model of the 
IMF and the OECD, respectively.
TABLE 5.2 - AVERAGE PRIMARy SURPLUS AND STRUCTURAL BUDGET BA-
LANCE By PRESIDENTIAL PERIOD - %
IMF OECD
Cycle year Primary 
S.
SBB¹ Difference SBB Difference
1° 1997-1998 1.56 1.09 0.47 0.32 1.24
2° 1999-2002 1.68 1.82 -0.14 1.74 -0.06
3° 2003-2006 2.15 2.53 -0.39 2.31 -0.16
4° 2007-2010 2.04 1.81 0.23 1.96 0.08
5° 2011-2013 1.92 1.86 0.06 1.89 0.03
Average 1.87 1.82 0.05 1.64 0.23
Source: Authors elaboration
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Regarding to the fiscal policy, it is noticed an alternation between periods 
of expansion and fiscal contraction, with eight years of contractionary fiscal 
policy and eight of expansionary, according to the IMF model. While the 
OECD model, we got nine years that fiscal policy was contractionary and 
seven with expansionary. The biggest fiscal squeeze occurred in the years 
1999, 2002 and 2003, respectively, with the IMF model. But when it comes 
to the OECD methodology, it is observed that larger squeeze occurred in 
1999, 2008 and 2010, respectively. In 1999 this fiscal tightening may be ex-
plained, probably, by the adoption of new tax rules that were imposed under 
the regime of inflation targeting. In 2003 this fiscal tightening may be related 
with a political change14, where this bigger surplus aimed an improvement of 
the expectations. Already in 2010 this fiscal tightening is related to the good 
performance of the economy after the crisis, when GDP grew 7.5% compared 
with the previous year.
The larger fiscal expansions occurred in 1998 and 2009 by the IMF metho-
dology, and 2009 and 2012 by the OECD methodology. In 1998 there was 
a large imbalance in the economy due to the volatility of the exchange rate. 
Thus, this may have been the reason for the large fiscal expansion in the year. 
But the OECD methodology pointed contractionary fiscal policy. In 2009 the 
fiscal relaxation may have occurred because of the impact of the subprime 
crisis, ie, a discretionary fiscal stimulus.
Table 5.3 shows the expansion or contraction, on average, of the fiscal policy 
in each presidential cycle. It is clear, analyzing the model of the IMF, two 
presidential cycles with contractionary fiscal policy, the first from 1999 to 
2002 and another from 2011 to 2013. Already from 2003 to 2010, a period 
that includes two presidential cycles, fiscal policy was expansionary. While in 
the OECD model the presidential cycle, from 1999 to 2002, show that fiscal 
policy was contractionary. So, from 2003 to 2013 we can see that the fiscal 
policy was expansionary.
14 In 2003, a political party, which was opposition for a long time, won the elections of 2002. This caused 
some turbulences on the markets, affecting the expectations.
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TABLE 5.3 - AVERAGE TAX DIRECTION By PRESIDENTIAL CyCLE15
IMF OECD
Presidential 
Cycle
Average 
ΔSPt-SPt-1
Direction of 
Fiscal Policy
Average 
ΔSPt-SPt-1
Direction of 
Fiscal Policy
1999-2002 0.46% Contraction 0.38% Contraction
2003-2006 -0.02% Expansion -0.02% Expansion
2007-2010 -0.16% Expansion -0.02% Expansion
2011-2013 0.09% Contraction -0.08% Expansion
Source: Authors elaboration
Graph 5.6 shows the evolution of the economic cycle, which is obtained by 
dividing the potential GDP by the observed, and the direction of the IMF model 
of fiscal policy. The horizontal line represents the point where the potential 
GDP equals real GDP and fiscal policy is neutral. Therefore, values  below that 
line represent points where real GDP is above potential GDP and also fiscal 
policy, compared to the previous year, was expansionary. Contrary are those 
where the trend GDP was higher than the actual GDP and also that fiscal 
policy was contractionary. When fiscal policy and the cycle are in opposite 
quadrants, that is, when fiscal policy is at a point below the horizontal line and 
cycle above we have countercyclical fiscal policy. The opposite is also true, ie 
when fiscal policy is above the horizontal line and the business cycle below.
Thus, from 1998 to 2003, fiscal policy was not countercyclical, ie, it did not 
act to stabilize the business cycle, However, from 2004 to 2012, except for 
2007, fiscal policy was countercyclical, when using the IMF model. Finally, 
in 2013 fiscal policy was procyclical. Thus, there were eight periods where 
fiscal policy was countercyclical, and eight that was procyclical. However, it 
is noteworthy that there were years in which fiscal policy was countercyclical, 
but the fiscal contraction could have been higher, as in the years 2010 and 
2011. Conversely, there were periods where fiscal expansion could have been 
greater, as the years 2004 and 2005.
15 It is emphasized that it was not called the first presidential cycle from 1997 to 1998, since it was not 
possible to calculate the direction of fiscal policy for the year 1997, since we had not the value of the 
structural budget balance of the year 1996. 
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GRAPH 5. 6 - BUSINESS CyCLE AND FISCAL POLICy - IMF
Source: Authors elaboration
Graph 5.7 shows the evolution of the economic cycle and the direction of 
fiscal policy using the OECD approach. It is apparent that this is very similar 
to that observed by the IMF method, ie, the two methodologies do not differ 
significantly. Thus, from 1999 to 2004 and in 2007 fiscal policy was pro-
-cyclical. In contrast, fiscal policy was countercyclical in 1998 and in the period 
2005-2013, with the exception of 2007. There are years in which fiscal policy 
estimated by the OECD model might have had greater magnitude to contain 
the economic cycle, both for expansion, and for contraction, as we see in the 
IMF model. Thus, in 2005, for example, fiscal policy was almost neutral and 
the growth was well below trend. Conversely, in 2011, for example, the fiscal 
contraction could have been higher, given that GDP grew well above trend.
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GRAPH 5. 7 - BUSINESS CyCLE AND FISCAL POLICy - OECD
Source: Authors elaboration
Thus, when the two lines are mirrored we can say that fiscal policy fulfills 
its stabilizing function. In this case, the two lines should show a negative 
correlation. If the correlation is positive fiscal policy is procyclical. Table 5.4 
shows the correlation between fiscal policy and the business cycle in each 
presidential cycle and in the total period for both the IMF and OECD model. 
We notice that, in general, in the first two presidential cycles the fiscal policy 
was pro-cyclical, and in the last two, oppositely, it was countercyclical.
Fiscal policy had a strong negative correlation with the business cycle, from 
2007 to 2010, signaling that the government may have made changes in the 
behavior of revenues and expenses in order to counteract the negative effects 
of the subprime crisis. This applies to both models. Another important aspect 
is that in the IMF model the positive correlation is much stronger than the 
OECD in the first presidential cycle. Still, the big difference between the two 
models is in the correlation between fiscal policy and the cycle in the period 
1998-2013. Thereby, the major difference observed between the two meto-
dolgies is that in the model of the IMF the correlation was positive while it 
was negative in the OECD.
Therefore, this result is consistent with the assertion of Rocha (2009), that 
there was not a discretionary attempt by Brazilian authorities, between 1995 
and 2005, in order to use fiscal policy to stabilize the business cycle, whereas 
fiscal policy, recorded through the structural result, in 2004 and 2005 was 
almost neutral. Evidences founded by Neto et al. (2003), that pointed that 
fiscal policy, in the state of Minas Gerais, was used for political gain, does not 
seem to fit nationwide. It’s only possible to say that only in the first presidential 
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cycle, since 1998, an election year, it was observed a strong fiscal expansion 
and in 1999 there was a fiscal contraction. Moreover, this statement is only 
valid for the model of the IMF. In the OECD model there is no such eviden-
ce for 1998. A factor that may have been decisive in order to suppress such 
practices was the adoption of the Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2000.
TABLE 5.4 - CORRELATION BETWEEN FISCAL POLICy AND THE BUSINESS 
CyCLE
IMF OECD
Cycles years Correlation Correlation
       1¹ 1998-2002 0.8352 0.1793
2 2003-2006 0.9371 0.7667
3 2007-2010 -0.95 -0.9973
4 2011-2013 -0.8376 -0.6900
Average 1998-2013 0.1935 -0.2822
Source: Authors elaboration
1. In this cycle, added the year 1998 to the cycle which covers the period 1999-2002.
One possible explanation for the procyclicality of fiscal policy until 2003, by 
IMF model, and 2004, to OECD model, is that the country was still in a pe-
riod of fiscal adjustment and fiscal policy was strongly biased with the goal of 
stabilizing the debt16. Thus, with the improvement of public accounts, it was 
also possible to use fiscal policy to stabilize the economy, as can be seen from 
2004 onwards, but more intensively since 2008. This is consistent with the 
Dolls et al. (2012) that performed the same for 19 EU countries and the U.S., 
where the previous fiscal situation before the subprime crisis had a major in-
fluence on fiscal stimulus undertaken with the intention of using fiscal policy 
countercyclical manner. Thus, as in Brazil’s public accounts were balanced, 
it was possible to carry out tax incentives and exemptions to face recession.
                                                         Conclusions
Applying IMF and OECD methodologies of SBB to Brazilian economy, it was 
possible to see that the observed output was below than the potential from 
1999 to 2006 except for the year of 2000. This meant that the structural 
budget balance was greater than the surplus obtained, which discards the 
16 Public debt remains very high in 2013 in Latin America countries and, like pointed by Klemm(2014), this 
can constraint the countercyclical policy
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influences of cycles. Since 2007-2011, with the exception of 2009, the opposite 
occurs, ie, the observed GDP was greater than potential GDP, which led to 
a structural budget balance smaller than the primary surplus. The last two 
years of the series are characterized by a lower GDP than the trend, leading 
to a structural budget balance greater than the primary surplus. Another use 
of the structural budget balance is the possibility of evaluating fiscal policy. 
It was found that, using the approach of the IMF, the biggest fiscal squeeze 
in Brazil was observed in 1999 and 2003, while the largest fiscal expansions 
occurred in 1998 and 2009. Already by the OECD approach, the larger squeeze 
occurred in 1999 and 2010, while the largest fiscal expansions were observed 
in the years 2009 and 2012. 
On the one hand it was observed that, from 1998 to 2003 and over the years 
2007 and 2013, fiscal policy was pro-cyclical using IMF model. With the 
OECD model, fiscal policy was pro-cyclical from 1999 to 2004 and in 2007. 
Moreover, it was noted that fiscal policy was countercyclical between the years 
2004-2012, with the exception of 2007, using IMF model. Apllying OECD 
method, fiscal policy was countercyclical in 1998 and from 2005 to 2013, 
with the exception of 2007. Therefore, using IMF methodology we got eight 
years of countercyclical fiscal policy and eight pro-cyclical. While with at the 
OECD approach, there is seven years where fiscal policy is procyclical and 
nine years where it was countercyclical. One explanation for the better use 
of fiscal policy in the period after 2004 may be the fiscal space. This occurred 
due to continuous fall in the stock of public debt after 2003.
Thus, although there are some peculiarities between the two methods, in 
general, they showed very similar results, which reinforce the robustness of 
the results. Finally, the structural budget balance is presented as an impor-
tant tool for assessing public finance and fiscal policy, and also appears as an 
alternative to the adoption of a new fiscal rule, which considers the effects of 
the economic cycle on public accounts. The adoption of this new fiscal rule 
could reconcile the strong bias of the public debt of the actual fiscal rule with 
the use of fiscal policy to minimize the short-term shocks. Still, the adoption 
of this tool could reduce cases of creative accounting that often occur in Brazil.
It is suggested for future work, re-estimate the elasticities of Mello and 
Moccero (2006) to compute the structural budget balance using the OECD 
methodology. Still, one can compute the structural budget balance excluding 
extraordinary income, as done by Gouvea et al (2011).
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Annex  
TABLE A.1 – EQUATIONS AND ITS TEST
EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5 EQ6
C(1) - -1,25[0,19] - - -0,7197[0,45] -
C(2) 1,0833[0,00] 1,1732[0,00] 0,9294[0,00] 0,95[0,00] 1,0425[0,00] 1,0845[0,00]
C(3) 0,0073[0,00] 0,0064[0,00] 0,0075[0,00] 0,0074[0,00] 0,0064[0,00] 0,0069[0,00]
C(4) 0,3205[0,00] 0,3329[0,00] 0,3105[0,00] 0,3077[0,00] 0,3094[0,00] 0,3191[0,00]
C(5) 0,0725[0,00] 0,0817[0,00] 0,0824[0,00] 0,087[0,00] 0,0967[0,00] 0,0835[0,00]
C(6) - -0,050,9[0,00] x x 0,0966[0,01] 0,0974[0,01]
C(7) x 0,0966[0,01] x x x -
2R 0,9876 0,9889 0,986 0,986 0,9879 0,9887
AIC -3,67 -3,75 -3,59 -3,59 -3,66 -3,70
SBC -3,47 -3,52 -3,42 -3,43 -3,46 -3,47
HQ -3,59 -3,66 -3,52 -3,53 -3,58 -3,61
LM(1) 0,05[0,81] 0,20[0,64] 0,13[0,71] 0,07[0,78] 0,633[0,42] 0,169[0,68]
LM(2) 0,05[0,97] 0,20[0,90] 0,16[0,92] 0,24[0,88] 0,9862[0,61] 0,3357[0,84]
ARCH(1) 0,15[0,69] 1,15[0,28] 1,58[0,2] 0,54[0,46] 0,16[0,68] 0,422[0,51]
ARCH(2) 0,46[0,79] 1,17[0,55] 2,52[0,28] 4,53[0,10] 6,94[0,03] 5,87[0,053]
RMSE 2,55 2,24 2,69 2,54 2,20 2,12
MAE 1,83 1,65 2,06 1,95 1,76 1,58
MAPE 2,74 2,58 3,07 3,01 2,85 2,58
Eq1: log(receita_sa)=c(1)+ c(2)*log(pib_sa(-1))+c(3)*@trend+c(4)*dummy1+c(5)*dummy2+c(6)*dummy5
Eq2 : log(receita_sa)=c(1)+c(2)*log(pib_sa(-1))+c(3)*@trend+c(4)*dummy1+c(5)*dummy2+c(6)*dum
my5+c(7)*dummy9
Eq3: log(receita_sa)=c(1)+c(2)*log(pib_sa(-1))+c(3)*@trend+c(4) *dummy1+c(5)*dummy2
Eq4: log(receita_sa)=c(1)+c(2)*log(pib_sa)+c(3)*@trend+c(4) *dummy1+c(5)*dummy2
Eq5: log(receita_sa)=c(1)+c(2)*log(pib_sa)+c(3)*@trend+c(4)*dummy1+c(5)*dummy2+c(6)*dummy3
Eq6: log(receita_sa)=c(1)+c(2)*log(pib_sa)+c(3)*@trend+c(4)*dummy1+c(5)*dummy2+c(6)*dummy3 
+c(7)*dummy4

